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Abstract
This paper explores the factors behind the increasing strategic significance of the Bay of Bengal in the 
current geopolitical context.
The study starts by highlighting the factors contributing to the rising importance of the littoral region 
from a general economic, geopolitical and energy perspective. It then analyses the specific objectives 
and strategic aspirations of the major powers involved in the Bay, and how those may turn the area into 
a hub of converging, and/or conflicting interests. The focus is then shifted toward the smaller littoral 
nations and their individual relations with the major players. Finally, challenges to stability in the region 
are discussed, and a cooperative approach is suggested for the context of the Bay. 
The paper argues that the strategic importance of the Bay will considerably increase in the coming years. 
As the nations involved are major and rising powers, the power play in the area will inevitably reshape 
the dynamics of the region. The interests that are at stake are also of crucial importance to the countries 
involved; hence, their protection will also demand a rapid militarization of the littoral. Most of these 
countries are now redirecting their focus from land to sea, which is adding a whole new dimension to the 
importance of the Bay. However, this paper argues that cooperation and competition is in all the nations’ 
best interest, as any conflict in the Bay region could bring in political, economic and energy insecurity 
affecting all the concerned countries. Another dimension this paper explores is the implication of this 
competition on smaller nations and their role in the larger schemes of the major powers.
In order to lay out an exhaustive and holistic view, historical, economic, military, geopolitical and social 
factors have been taken into account in this research. 
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Introduction
During the Cold War era, strategic ocean theatres were mainly centred 
on the Atlantic and the Pacific. For a long time, the Indian Ocean had not 
been considered a forecourt for potential superpower competition, let 
alone confrontation. In recent years, however, the scenario has changed 
considerably. The unprecedented economic growth of China, doubling 
every seven years since Deng’s reforms, the rise of India to the status 
of a major power in Asia through its increased trade and productivity, 
and the democratization and economic growth of developing nations 
drastically increasing energy demand, have completely recalibrated the 
importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to the world. In his book 
entitled “Monsoon” Robert D. Kaplan argues that the IOR is on its way 
to becoming the nexus of world power and conflict in the coming years 
(Kaplan 2010). As the Bay of Bengal (BoB) is a major part of the IOR, the 
power plays taking place therein will have a significant effect in shaping 
the regional strategic landscape as well. 
In terms of significance, the region has been dynamic since the third 
century BCE approximately, long before the Europeans had discovered 
the IOR. Then, the trade routes connected East Asia, Southeast Asia, 
South Asia, Arabia and East Africa (Szczepanski 2014). For centuries, the 
trade routes led way to exchange of commodities and also of religious 
thoughts, allowing the spread of many religions and cultures across the 
continent and beyond. A turning point in the history of the IOR sea trades 
was the arrival of the Portuguese sailors under Vasco de Gama in the 
15th century. During that time, trade from Asia to Europe was booming, 
as the demand for Asian luxury goods was very high. However, there 
was not much demand in Asia for European commodities. From that 
imbalance, the trade dynamics changed – the Portuguese decided 
to enter the IOR as pirates rather than traders, they began to seize port 
cities, rob and extort local merchants. This was followed by the arrival of 
the Dutch East India Company in the early 17th century. This European 
power adopted a more ruthless approach by seeking a monopoly over 
the lucrative products of the region. Around 1680, the British East India 
Company followed suit, which led to conflicts over the control of the 
Indian subcontinent’s sea trade routes. This strong European presence 
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in the region was later concretised through the colonisation era, which 
officially ended the practise of reciprocal trade, making the Asian trading 
empires grow weaker, poorer and eventually collapse (Szczepanski 2014). 
Now, the region, which had been under strong Western influence and 
power, is slowly going back into the hands of the indigenous nations. 
In terms of partnerships, there is also a change in the actors involved – 
while the past decades had been characterised by a strong North-South 
cooperation, now South-South cooperation is flooding the sub-regions. 
The BoB is becoming more and more strategically significant for many 
countries. With ever-increasing energy demands, the Sea Lines of 
Communications (SLOC) and their protection are becoming a priority for 
the Asian countries. Since the BoB leads to the Malacca Strait, that opens 
up to the South China Sea (SCS), these routes are crucial to economies 
in the SCS  (China, Japan) – which explains the growing interest and 
involvement of extra-littoral players in the Bay. Protection of SLOCs has 
added to the importance of increasing maritime power projection 
capabilities in the BoB. Even though relatively manageable in terms of 
confrontations between nations, the intentions of the major powers are 
increasingly being questioned. In terms of foreign policy strategy, China 
is clearly adopting a “Look South” policy, reflected through its heavy 
infrastructure investments in the countries around the Bay. India is opting 
for a “Look East” policy, to intensify connectivity to Southeast Asia and 
the US with its Asia “Rebalancing” strategy which shifts its focus from the 
Middle East to this dynamic region. 
In addition to the major powers and their interests in the BoB, the 
littoral nations are also gaining in importance. Bangladesh has made 
commendable economic progress. The country is now inviting investment 
in maritime infrastructure building in the Bay to upgrade its strategic value. 
Another aspect of Bangladesh’s policy that has had a positive impact on 
the Bay was the dispute resolutions through the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) with Myanmar in 2012 and, very recently, with 
India in July 2014. Myanmar just opened up its doors to foreign investment 
and is attracting a plethora of actors for its resource endowments. Having 
all these nations at play, following similar ambitions and objectives in the 
BoB, will inevitably lead to competition and maybe even conflict. 
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As the sub-region is very dynamic and subject to changes, it is important 
to examine the competition that is taking place and explore the possible 
implications for the littoral and extra-regional powers. This paper will 
examine these aspects with a view to shedding some light on the current 
and future situation in this dynamic region. 
The objectives of this paper are to (1) identify the factors contributing to 
the rising importance of the Bay of Bengal, (2) highlight the significance of 
increased naval focus therein, (3) analyse the strategic competition taking 
place between and among the littoral and extra-littoral actors in the Bay 
of Bengal, (4) examine the implications of this growing competition in the 
BoB for smaller littoral nations of the Bay and their roles in the strategies of 
major players, and (5) outline the emerging scenarios and incentives for 
greater peace and stability in the sub-region.
This paper argues that the Bay of Bengal’s strategic significance will see 
a remarkable increase in the coming years. As the actors involved are 
Asia’s major and rising powers, the need for energy security, increased 
connectivity and trade are going to be their main strategic objectives. 
Since the major powers are largely dependent on the SLOCs for their 
energy supply, the protection of those routes and competition over other 
resources have induced a rapid militarization of the region. As the current 
scenario involves many stakeholders and strategic interests, the risks of 
conflict are looming. However, we argue that the major players, due 
to their energy needs, common benefit of stability at sea for the SLOCs 
and connectivity for economic and strategic purposes, will gain more 
by cooperation and the use of soft power rather than through conflict. 
Additionally, it is suggested that smaller littoral nations play an important 
role in the larger strategic design of the major players. These countries are 
also benefiting from the dynamic competition in the BoB among bigger 
players and using it for their individual growth and development. 
This paper is divided into five sections with an Introduction and a Conclusion. 
The first section provides a brief historical overview and some basic data 
on the Bay of Bengal. The second analyses the factors contributing to 
the rising importance of the region, mainly economic, political, energy 
and geographic dimensions. The main strategic objectives of the major 
players - India, China and the US - are discussed in the third section, with 
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an attempt to explore the rivalries between the major powers and their 
conflicting interests converging in the Bay. The fourth section highlights the 
importance of the smaller littoral nations for the bigger powers, and looks 
at how the littorals can take advantage of the competition in the region 
and galvanize their own growth. Finally, the fifth section focuses on the 
challenges to stability and suggests a cooperative architecture for the 
BoB.  The paper concludes by saying that cooperation is in every nation’s 
best interest in this particular region and that a stable and competitive 
environment will achieve more than the use of hard power in the BoB 
waters and/or in its littoral nations. 
Knowing the Bay of Bengal
Location and Basic Data on the Bay
Located in the northern extension of the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal 
occupies an area of about 2,173,000 square km, making it the largest 
Bay in the world (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2009). It is situated between 
vital sea routes and stretches from Sri Lanka up to the coast of eastern 
India, curving under Bangladesh and Myanmar and heading south along 
Thailand and Malaysia until it reaches the northern coast of Sumatra in 
Indonesia (Yhome 2014). A quarter of the world’s population resides in the 
countries bordering the BoB, with approximately 400 million people living 
in its catchment areas; and these numbers are expected to increase by 
20% by the year 2015 (Yhome 2014). This makes the Bay one of the most 
densely populated coastlines on Earth. Figure 1 shows a map of the Bay 
of Bengal and the littoral nations around it. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Bay of Bengal. Source: World Atlas Maps. Bay of 
Bengal
On a geo-strategic level, the BoB lies between two huge economic blocs 
- the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) - connecting the South 
East Asian economy to Middle Eastern oil sources. According to the 2011 
British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy, approximately 
100 trillion cubic feet, or approximately 1% of the world’s total unexploited 
oil and gas reserves are located along the coasts of Myanmar, India and 
Bangladesh (BP 2011). The tremendous economic potential that the Bay 
offers due to its untapped natural resources, makes it strategically central 
for its littorals, i.e. Bangladesh, Myanmar, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India, as well as for global powers like the US and 
China.
Historical Overview of the Bay
Even before the Atlantic, the BoB served as a maritime highway between 
nations. For centuries, trade and human migration shaped the littoral 
and its surrounding states. In the period from 1600 to the 1800s, the BoB 
witnessed an intensification of trade primarily by the Portuguese and the 
Dutch. By the 1820s, it was the British Empire that had a substantial grasp 
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around the Bay’s coasts (Amrith 2013: 64). Between the 1870s and the 
1930s, more than 25 million people crossed the Bay, most of them being 
young men from southern and eastern India en route to the tea estates of 
Sri Lanka, the rubber plantations of Malaysia, and the docks and rice mills 
of Myanmar - although much of this migration was circular rather than 
permanent (Amrith 2013: 64). After the 1930s, however, environmental and 
politico-economic pressures started to erode this age-old configuration of 
interconnections. 
Today, the Bay emerges as one of the most significant regions in the world 
due to its geological, economic, political and strategic characteristics. 
While the Bay still remains an arena for strategic competition between 
rising powers, as it was in the eighteenth century, today those powers are 
mostly regional rather than Western (Devare 2008). 
Factors of the rising importance of the Bay
Economic, Political, Energy and Connectivity Dimensions
The rising importance of the Bay is closely linked to the rapid economic 
growth of its littoral nations and of the major powers involved in the Bay. 
If we look at China, the nation has become the principal importer of raw 
materials, is one of the biggest manufacturing nations globally, and is 
unquestionably the largest consumer market in the world. India and the 
smaller littoral countries have also increased exports and bilateral trade 
with South and Southeast Asian countries. 
In addition to the economic factors, political changes facilitated growth 
and cooperation and brought more stability to the BoB littoral. Even though 
the majority of the littoral nations are considered to be weak or fragile 
states, there has been a visible process of democratisation. If we look at 
Myanmar, the country recently came out of half a century of military junta 
and is opening up to the world, economically and politically. Bangladesh is 
considered a weak state yet, despite unpropitious conditions, the country 
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is making enormous and commendable economic and developmental 
strides. In that regard, the country was also identified as one of the N11 
nations by Goldman Sachs (Goldman Sachs 2007). 
Increased political and economic cooperation has allowed for the 
development of infrastructure projects in and around the Bay. For most of 
the Asian nations, this growth is accompanied by a rise in energy needs. 
China is expected to surpass the US in terms of energy demand by 2015. 
Figure 2, representing the countries that are among the highest net oil 
importers, shows China and India among the top 4.
Figure 2: Top ten annual oil importers 2013. 
China and India have now become heavily dependent on oil imports, 
which are expected to rise to 75% and 95% respectively of their total oil 
consumption by 2030 (shown in Figure 3 and 4). In terms of natural gas, 
their imports are also expected to increase to 40% (China) and 50% (India) 
(HCSS 2010). This will cause the two countries to increase dependence on 
energy imports over land and by sea. As a result, the importance of the 
BoB as a transit region will keep increasing, as it will witness expansion of 
SLOCs and intensification of naval presence for both India and China.
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Source: US Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics
Figure 3: India fossil fuel consumption 
Figure 4: China’s oil production and consumption, 1993-2015
Due to its strategic location, the BoB not only serves the littoral nations 
around the Bay but also other major actors like China and Japan, which 
through the Malacca Strait, access it for trade in goods and energy. Now, 
the major concern for many of these countries is to secure the SLOCs 
as trade and energy imports are crucial to their economies. This, in turn, 
has added a security dimension to the Bay –countries are now seeking to 
increase their maritime power and power projection capabilities. 
In addition to securing the SLOCs, countries like Bangladesh are also putting 
an emphasis on delimitating their maritime boundaries to demarcate and 
secure blocks of natural resources for instance. The recent Bangladesh-
Myanmar and Bangladesh-India maritime boundary dispute in the BoB, 
mostly motivated by exploration needs of natural resources or on a larger 
scale by the need to delimitate the territorial sea, the exclusive economic 
zone or the continental shelf, are a case in point of this renewed focus. 
It would be interesting to point out here that in the BoB, the stabilizing 
factor in these processes has been the trend of settling disputes in a 
diplomatic and rather cooperative manner unlike in the SCS, where 
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tensions between China and the SCS littorals keep arising. Instead of using 
a bilateral mechanism, countries like Bangladesh opted for the assistance 
of International legal forums for their dispute resolutions. In the case of 
Bangladesh and Myanmar, following the events of November 2008, 
when the Myanmarese Navy led Korean exploration ships to Bangladeshi 
waters, Bangladesh took the issue to the ITLOS to avoid the occurrence of 
similar incidents in the future. The court gave its verdict in 2012, resolving 
the dispute. India and Bangladesh also recently settled the 40 year old 
maritime boundary dispute. Both countries had been engaged in long 
and inconclusive negotiations on the delimitation of their maritime 
boundary since 1974, engaging in eight rounds of bilateral negotiations. 
In October 2009 Bangladesh served India with notice of arbitration on the 
issue (Burke 2014). The case was handled by the Arbitral Tribunal in The 
Hague, and the court delivered its ruling in July 2014. 
These disputes drew attention to the Bay, and the international community 
commended the manner in which they were resolved. Hence, despite 
instability in some of the littoral states, the overall mechanism for dispute 
resolution has been stable and territorial disputes were resolved peacefully. 
This in turn has built more investor confidence in and around the Bay 
for local and global actors mainly in the energy sector. Both nations 
are cooperating in order to individually and regionally benefit from the 
economic value of the BoB, which could not be realised until and unless 
the dispute was settled (Keck 2014). 
Another aspect that significantly adds to the Bay’s importance is the 
growing demand of landlocked areas for access to the waters such as 
India’s northeast, China’s southern region, Nepal, and Bhutan. Having 
access to the Bay could have an enormous impact on their development 
and economic growth, as it is a major transit route for inter-continental 
and regional trade in commercial goods and natural resources. 
These politico-economic factors have largely contributed to turning the 
BoB into the next geopolitical and geo-strategic hub of Asia. Increasing 
energy demand and strong militarization of the waters will inevitably spur 
competition among the major powers. Their strategies will determine if these 
interactions will be characterised by conflict, competition or cooperation. 
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Strategic competition in the Bay between regional 
and extra regional actors
As this paper analyses the strategic ambitions of major players in the BoB, it is 
necessary to include their goals in the IOR as a whole. To a certain degree, 
their strategy in the BoB can be an extension of their strategy in the IOR 
in general. Geographically, the BoB gives access to other major sea lines, 
most importantly the Malacca Strait, hence it is important to acknowledge 
the indirect influences of the larger landscape. Kaplan (2010) warns that 
the region will become a centre of global conflict due to the intensification 
of trade through its routes but, more importantly, due to the fact that the 
interests of major players intersect and overlap in the area. 
In the following sub-sections we will elaborate on the causes of increased 
competition between regional and extra-regional powers in the BoB. These 
are mainly defined by geostrategic (energy security, maritime power 
projection capabilities and connectivity) and economic (increasing 
significance of seaborne trade) factors. 
On the one hand, there has been a considerable increase of energy 
demand by growing economies which has created energy security 
challenges in the region – the economies of the littoral and the hinterland 
nations of the BoB are generally resource-poor and hence trade-
dependent. On the other hand, the regional production has been 
declining, creating increasing reliance of these nations on foreign energy 
imports, which are mostly delivered by sea (Khan 2013). 
Maritime presence and growth is another crucial element shaping the 
dynamics and forming the new configurations in the Bay. The recent 
maritime zone claims and boundary disputes among littoral nations are 
motivated by the emerging interests and the need for building adequate 
military capabilities to protect those boundaries and resources. Figure 5 
represents the number and kind of military bases present in the IOR. 
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Figure 5: Military bases in the IOR. Source: HCSS report
In terms of geopolitical competition, there are three major powers at play 
in the BoB - India, China and the US. India considers the BoB as “home” 
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and its strategy is mainly to adapt to other major players’ interests in 
the region. China, though not a littoral country, is trying to increase its 
presence through growing cooperation with other littoral nations. The 
US, not a littoral nation either, is slowly shifting its strategic focus from the 
Middle East to Asia. In addition to these super/major powers, there are 
other countries that need to be taken into the equation such as Japan, 
Russia and the littoral states Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.
China in the Bay of Bengal
In order to understand the complexity of China’s strategic situation, one 
needs to take into account its remarkable economic growth over the 
last decades. In just over a single decade, China’s foreign trade went 
from $289 billion dollars to an astounding $2.560 trillion in 2005 (Eshel 2011). 
However, one main commodity that Beijing lacks is oil. Today, the country 
is the second largest global oil consumer. In order to sustain its economic 
growth, China’s strategic priorities are to find reliable oil supplies and 
secure unencumbered SLOCs. These expanding economic and strategic 
interests may cause the PLAN to operate out of area in order to safeguard 
investments and SLOCs. This explains China’s focus on military facilities 
along the SLOCs from China to the Persian Gulf (Eshel 2011). Figure 6 gives 
us a better idea of China’s presence in the littoral nations. 
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Figure 6: China’s investments abroad. Source: HCSS Report
As other powers shift their focus, Beijing is also focusing on its “Look South” 
approach. In 2013, President Xi Jinping suggested two initiatives, the 
Continental Silk Route and the Maritime Silk Route. The initiatives would 
extend China’s influence in two belts: The Bangladesh–China–India–
Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM), which would also 
connect China’s Yunnan province to the BoB and the China-Pakistan 
Silk Road Economic Belt, which is a railway project that would connect 
China’s Kashgar to the Gwadar port in Pakistan (Jia 2014). These initiatives 
would fulfil the purpose of greater connectivity in the region for Beijing.
In addition to Beijing’s quest for energy and connectivity, this orientation 
has been also triggered by China’s uneasiness of the US “Rebalancing” 
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strategy. In response, China has continued its naval build-up which has 
seen an exorbitant 500% rise since 2000 (Jha 2014).
Consequently, current Chinese maritime policies are intended as a 
warning, especially to the US, not to intervene in Chinese affairs, especially 
in the South China Sea (SCS). Parallels can be made here to the US Monroe 
doctrine, declared in 1823 to deter European powers from meddling in 
seas the US considered as its natural sphere of influence (Yoon 2014). 
Interestingly, China is playing two different games in two different seas. In 
the SCS, where China is a littoral nation, there is a strategic competition with 
the US and rival Asian nations – China is allegedly defying the international 
law of the sea by continuing to patrol and police near ASEAN countries 
(CNAS 2009). This tense geo-strategic area is China’s foreign policy priority, 
as conflicts here are mainly related to its territorial sovereignty. 
Very recently, president Xi Jinping officially declared China’s intention 
to strengthen its frontier defences on land and sea. He also called for 
the country to boost its military into a force that can “win battles” (Daily 
Star 2014). As a result, the People’s Republic of China has adopted a 
strategic approach that includes land, maritime, economic and energy 
security components (Rajan 2014). The naval build-up has added a new 
dimension to the PLAN’s capabilities– going from that of conducting 
coastal defence activities to the potential of high sea defence. 
For a long time, China had given primacy to land security. In the 1980s when 
China began opening up, new economic linkages were complemented 
by greater dependence on sea lanes for export and import of goods 
and oil respectively (Bedford 2009). Additionally, with the fall of the Soviet 
Union, China could stop focusing on its land border and turn its attention 
toward the sea. 
Securing SLOCs has become one of its main objectives and a way to 
address the “Malacca Dilemma” and reduce its reliance on the Malacca 
strait through which about 80% of its energy import is transported. This 
makes Beijing’s energy security vulnerable because of the US’ objective 
to control the Strait and because of pirate attacks. China is therefore 
exploring other options, which would allow it to bypass the Strait, by 
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transporting resources through roads and sea from the BoB (Stratrisk 2013). 
The Chinese-built gas pipeline from Kyaukpyu in Myanmar to Kunming, 
which became operational in 2013, with a parallel crude oil pipeline, is 
one such project (Samaranayake 2014).
Additionally, China is seeking port access agreements with littoral countries 
of the Bay. However, as India is also extending its sphere of influence east 
and west on land and at sea, there is a possibility that it will ‘bump heads’ 
with China which is protecting its interests and is expanding its reach in 
the region.
Finally, be it energy needs or strategic motivations, China’s commercial 
and infrastructure investment in the region have been astonishing. It has 
offered the BoB nations billions of dollars in loans for the construction of 
ports and roads and for other infrastructure projects, ensuring its influence 
in and around the Bay (Samaranayake 2014). For instance, Beijing has 
been deeply involved in countries like Sri Lanka, where it has contributed 
approximately $4 billion in loans, grants and aid since the end of the civil 
war in 2009 and is responsible for almost 70% of the country’s infrastructure 
projects (Columbage 2014). Currently, China and Bangladesh are also 
in talks over the $9.03 billion worth of financial support that the latter 
requested from Beijing (mostly for infrastructure development projects 
over a period of five years) (Kabir 2014). On the regional scale, in 
November 2014, China offered $20 billion in preferential and special loans 
to develop infrastructure and increase cooperation with its South East 
Asian neighbours (Shannon 2014). All these examples reflect the Asian 
Giant’s stronghold over the sub regions.  
The US in the Bay of Bengal
In recent years, US interests in the region have grown and evolved 
because it recognizes the tremendous potential this sub-region has due 
to its demographic strength, the transiting of high value goods, and its 
resource endowments (Kapur 2014). In addition, some scholars argue 
that America’s shift in focus may also have been triggered by China’s fast 
expansion in the region. As a result, the US is now reallocating resources in 
Asia as its Rebalancing Strategy. 
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As was expected, the deployment of US ships and personnel in Asia and 
its increasing cooperation with the ASEAN states generated a wave of 
criticism from China. The Obama administration renamed the ‘Asia Pivot’ 
as the ‘Rebalancing’ strategy, as China was showing discontent with 
containment strategies aimed at preventing its rise. The new “Rebalancing” 
strategy now officially aims at engaging China, strengthening ties with 
allies and creating new strategic partnerships. The underlying security 
challenges that arise from this scenario lie in the fact that the US, its allies 
and strategic partners all see an attractive economic partner in China. This 
in turn creates doubts for the US of having its allies stand by their expected 
commitments in their differences with China (Chintamani 2014).
Another important factor is that the US does not have the same presence 
in the BoB as it does in the SCS, where it benefits from greater and longer 
partnerships with the ASEAN nations. To add to its disadvantage, most 
of the countries of the Bay already have strong ties with either India or 
China. Hence, the current US strategy tries to play on these dependencies 
by working closely with South Asian nations in order to prevent them from 
becoming overly reliant on either of the two major powers.
In terms of military strategy, the US Navy has unparalleled power 
projection capabilities in South and Southeast Asian waters. China’s 
renewed assertiveness in the SCS and its growing interest in the BoB is of 
particular concern to the US which sees China’s rise as a threat to its role 
as a provider of regional stability.
In sum, after having neglected the sub-region for many years, the US 
is challenged by the growing influence of India and China as major 
maritime and economic powers in the area, for the first time threatening 
its hegemony.  
In order to set limits on China’s expansion, the principal task of the US 
Navy would be to covertly leverage the sea power of India, in the IOR, 
and Japan, in the Western Pacific. It is in the US’ long-term economic 
interest to prevent the region from being dominated by any single state 
thereby disturbing the balance of power in the region. Accordingly, one 
of its crucial aims is to balance the growing levels of Chinese investments 
in the regional countries.
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Moreover, the prospect of any key choke points being controlled by 
any Asian nation could tilt the balance of trade further toward Asia. The 
persistent concerns of piracy attacks in the Strait of Malacca demonstrate 
the consequences of failing to ensure free and secure access through the 
choke point. Nevertheless, the dilemma for the US is that by preventing or 
blocking supply to China and India, it risks stifling the world economy—and 
so is naturally averse to pursuing this option. Additionally, with regard to 
a US-Chinese understanding at sea – crucial for the stabilization of world 
politics in the current geopolitical landscape – the US is trying to seize 
opportunities to incorporate China’s Navy into international alliances.
Yet, to achieve its geopolitical objectives in the region, the US capitalizes 
on the India-China rivalry to its own advantage. It engages with India 
within its strategy of inclosing China, and encourages India to strengthen 
relations with Southeast and Central Asian states. The fact that the US is 
enhancing its naval presence in the Bay of Bengal indicates the region’s 
growing central position in current world political affairs (Stratrisk 2014).
India and the Bay of Bengal
As part of the greater IOR, the BoB has historically been regarded as India’s 
sphere of influence. However, until recently it was treated as backwaters, 
and it was only after external actors started showing interest in the region 
that India realized the importance of protecting this geo-strategic area 
situated right above one of the world’s busiest SLOCs. 
In terms of its foreign policy and strategy, India has adopted a ‘look 
East’ approach. The nation is also showing interest in building what it 
calls the “Bay of Bengal community”, where it envisages greater security 
cooperation amongst the littoral nations. As a result, India may focus on 
strengthening security ties with countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar. 
In other frameworks, such as the BCIM, the three countries and China are 
collectively cooperating. However, this time, India may opt for cooperation 
that does not include China as a reaction to China’s assertiveness in the 
BoB region.
The significance of the BoB to India’s economy is immense. In 2013, 95% 
of India’s foreign trade by volume and 75% by value were conducted by 
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sea; and more than 75% of its oil was imported by sea (Hughes 2014). With 
India’s economic growth, the importance of its Navy also grew. As part 
of its maritime strategy, India states explicitly that it will strive to ensure the 
safety of the Ocean’s SLOCs as being critical for economic growth, for 
itself and for the global community. 
It is also cognizant of the fact that smaller nations in its neighbourhood, as 
well as nations that depend on the waters of the BoB for their trade and 
energy supplies, have come to expect that the Indian Navy will ensure 
stability and tranquillity in the waters around its shores (HCSS 2010).
Between 1980 and 2009, the Indian Navy progressed from being a 
“brown-water” to almost a “blue-water” force. The country’s economic 
rise fuelled its defence budget and strengthened its position in the IOR. 
The Navy is also involved in other activities such as providing critical 
training and equipment to numerous Indian Ocean countries, and its 
MILAN exercise now includes sixteen Asian and African navies and coast 
guards (Samaranayake 2014).
Furthermore, Prime Minister Modi asserted that he had accorded the 
highest priority to the modernization of defence forces, as strong security 
was necessary for an atmosphere of peace, amity and harmony in the 
country. Consequently, India’s new maritime doctrine includes new 
policies such as Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Piracy missions. Since the 
country cannot match China’s force-for-force, it needs to seek bilateral 
alliances, maritime domain awareness, and network-centric operations. 
In that regard, enhancing the security of small island states is an integral 
part of that strategy (Vines 2012).
An additional reason behind strengthening its naval power is India’s 
“Hormuz dilemma”; it refers to its dependence on imports through the 
Strait, close to the shores of Pakistan, where the Chinese are helping the 
Pakistanis develop deep-water ports. India’s objectives are hence to 
gain “strategic autonomy”. This policy is aligned with the Indian goal of 
achieving superpower status and it is in this context that we see India 
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Delhi’s naval modernization may also be the outcome of a perceived 
maritime threat posed by China’s naval growth. In reaction, India is 
simultaneously developing relationships with states in Southeast Asia and 
the Western Pacific, causing some in China to question its motives. There 
is fear in Delhi that Beijing may be outrunning them and strengthening 
its strategic position in the Bay. China’s investment in infrastructure and 
financial aid to the littoral countries could pose a serious threat to India 
which, up until now, remained the most important partner for many of 
these nations. Now, Delhi is re-focusing on the Bay of Bengal Initiative 
through a Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 
with emphasis on improving transport connectivity across the southern 
Asian littoral. It is also sponsoring the construction of new road and river 
connections between its land-locked northeast states and the BoB through 
new port facilities at Sittwe in Myanmar, to be completed by 2015.
Additionally, Indian officials have welcomed the US rebalance to Asia but 
made it clear that its “Look East Policy” is separate from the US rebalance and 
driven by Indian and not US interests, thus the interests are not synonymous. 
Nonetheless, a number of counter-terrorism and anti-piracy efforts have been 
conducted in coordination with American forces. US interest in countering the 
threat of terrorism in South Asia has pushed India and the United States towards 
more substantive military cooperation.
India’s economic and political links across the BoB are growing, accompanied 
by an expansion of India’s regional security role. The nation has long aspired 
to be recognized as the predominant power in the BoB and to assume a 
greater strategic role in Southeast Asia. These ambitions are consistent with the 
perspectives of many ASEAN states which generally perceive India as a positive 
factor in the regional balance of power, in contrast with China (Brewster 2014).
Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Bay
Historical mistrust between China and India has encouraged mutual 
suspicion regarding each other’s intentions. India and China both view 
the BoB as a crucial frontier in their competition over energy resources, 
shipping lanes, and cultural influence. The competition stemming from the 
two countries expanding their regional sphere of influence in each other’s 
backyards may result in skirmishes over energy, SLOCs or maritime issues. 
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Up until now, the strongest manifestation of Sino-Indian rivalry in the BoB 
was in Myanmar where they both connect through Myanmar to their 
economically weaker regions, namely India’s Northeast and China’s 
Yunnan province. However, since 2011 Myanmar opened its economy 
to the Western world after the US and Europe lifted sanctions (BBC 2014), 
creating more partnership options as the reforms attracted a wave of 
foreign investors. This in turn reduced Sino-Indian competition by making 
space for new actors and creating more balance in the previously 
polarized scenario.
Another major aspect of the rivalry lies in the so-called String of Pearls 
Strategy that China allegedly pursues. However, although there is 
competition, there is little evidence that the Chinese are planning an 
encirclement of India with their naval facilities stretching from southern 
China across the Indian Ocean. Their strategy appears benign, seeking 
agreements, allowing access to facilities for resupply, etc. The Chinese are 
here not for bases but for access. Bases would involve huge amounts of 
investment and would have political implications. It is not just the Chinese 
Navy that seeks access, the Indian Navy pursues access facilities too but 
follows a different strategy from that of the Chinese. While the Chinese 
provide aid in infrastructure building, the Indians create small pockets of 
bilateral naval exercises (Agnihotri 2014).
In an attempt to reduce suspicion, China has recently invited India to 
join the country’s efforts of building a wide network of new silk roads on 
land and sea with the aim of increasing global connectivity (Time of 
India 2014). Another challenge for China may be India’s military reaction 
making Chinese sea lines more vulnerable; Beijing is already worried 
about the Malacca dilemma, and now the Andaman and Nicobar 
(A&N) Command will put India’s naval and air power in a position to 
control access to the Strait of Malacca (McDevitt 2013). Whether it is the 
US or India, whoever controls the Strait, will have a stronghold on Beijing’s 
energy access, which constitutes a serious concern for China. 
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Implications og growing strategic competition in 
the Bob 
The littoral surrounding the BoB is arguably one of the most complex 
regions in the world, comprising of a diverse range of economic, political 
and social cultures that has created a mix of idiosyncratic opportunities 
and risks in each state. The relations that these nations maintain with 
each other affect their development – or lack thereof – at a time when 
interdependencies are increasing in the region and beyond (Cordesman 
& Toukan 2014). Much like Central Asia, a multi-vector “Great Game” 
in the South Asian region includes numerous processes such as the US’ 
rebalancing, China’s assertiveness, Russia’s re-entry as a global power, 
Japan’s quest for economic revival, India’s Look East policy, politics 
of energy security, and so on. With the evolution and intensification of 
these processes, the regional security in the BoB and the socioeconomic 
conditions are being profoundly transformed.
The Role of Littoral Nations in the Strategies of Major Powers and the 
Implication of Strategic Competition on Littoral Nations
As the U.S., China and India adopt a macro approach, littoral nations seek 
ways to pursue their own development, essentially through infrastructure 
development, decreasing small nation dependencies, and creating new 
partnerships. Additionally, the existence of a competitive environment is 
a determining factor in promoting regional integration. As we can see 
for the littoral nations, beside the three major powers involved in the Bay, 
other nations like Japan and Russia are also taking advantage of this 
competition to make their way into the BoB through the littorals. 
Bangladesh and Myanmar are crucial entry points to non-littoral states in 
the BoB such as India’s Seven Sisters, China, and Japan. These countries 
need the Bay for their internal development, their connectivity to the rest 
of the region and for strategic purposes. In this regard, Bangladesh and 
Myanmar are headed to become bridges between South and Southeast 
Asia. These new strategic opportunities are pushing these nations to 
modernize their infrastructure, increase connectivity and bank on their 
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strategic geographic location.
Following are some of the important investment and strategic partnerships 
that reflect the nature of the relationships between the littorals and the 
major powers in the BoB region. 
The Importance of Sri Lanka
Delhi and Colombo enjoy a strong trade and investment relationship; the 
latter is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia and India is Sri Lanka’s 
largest trading partner globally. In addition, Colombo is one of the largest 
recipients of development credit by the Indian Government, which mostly 
comes in the form of disaster-relief and infrastructure building.
The two neighbours are also enhancing their defence relationship through 
extensive training (Government of India 2014).
Sri Lanka also shares robust ties with China; the latter is its largest source 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). China has also provided development 
loans for projects such as the new Colombo Port Terminal, Hambantota 
Port, and a four-lane expressway among others. These investments have 
played a pivotal role in accelerating Sri Lanka’s development in the 
region. In return, the country recently agreed to join China’s ambitious 
Maritime Silk Route project, which reflects a strategic partnership both 
will benefit from. For China, access to Hambantota is essential for its new 
strategic, connectivity and economic aspirations; for Sri Lanka, this can 
be an opportunity to become an important player in the development of 
BoB trading ports (Goodman 2014).
Sri Lanka is a willing and capable partner in effectively combating violent 
extremism, trafficking and piracy, thereby helping to ensure the maritime 
security of the region. In this regard the US’ anti-extremism approach 
has opened up avenues for cooperation. As both China and India will 
continue to engage extensively with Colombo, Washington has interest in 
having closer security ties, as in the other littoral nations. 
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The Importance Of Myanmar
If we look at Myanmar, the new government has been approving projects 
that had been sitting idle for years (Economist 2014). This dynamic regional 
context has allowed Nay Pyi Taw to deal with a plethora of new partners 
competing to enter its resource-rich market. The country has been 
leapfrogging since its recent reforms and experiencing unprecedented 
FDI growth since 2009. 
For India, Myanmar is of great strategic importance - the country can 
become India’s link to Southeast Asia as it is a part of ASEAN, vital for 
India’s “Look East” policy. Many Indian companies have largely invested 
in trade and infrastructure, for example the Kaladan project which would 
connect the Kolkata Port to Sittwe Port. Another project that would 
improve India’s connectivity is the upgrading of the Kalewa-Yargyi road 
to a highway (Ramaswamy & Maini 2014).
Nay Pyi Taw holds great strategic importance for China due to its energy 
endowments. The pipelines through Myanmar have the potential to help 
China reduce its heavy dependence on the Strait of Malacca for the 
transportation of energy. This, of course, has strategic implications against 
the backdrop of the United States’ rebalancing in Asia and the on-going 
maritime disputes in the SCS. The successful building of the pipelines 
through Myanmar could reduce China’s dependence on the Strait of 
Malacca by 30% (Melkulangara 2013).
Japan is similarly showing interest in Myanmar. During a recent visit, the 
Japanese Premier agreed to cancel the $1.74 billion debt owed by the 
country to Japan, but also pledged to lend Myanmar more than half a 
billion dollars for infrastructure and power projects in the country (Song 
2013). Japan is also developing the Thilawa Special Economic Zone in 
Thanhlyn-Kyauktan area of suburban Yangon. The multi-million project 
includes building a seaport, roads and other infrastructural development 
programmes (Asia News Network 2013).
In terms of security, both India and China have been strengthening 
their military cooperation with Myanmar. Over the years, Myanmar has 
gotten military equipment supplies from China and received training for 
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officers from both India and China. The country is trying to balance its 
dependence on China by exploring its other strategic partnership options 
(Yhome 2014).
Russia is another player asserting its presence in Myanmar. Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov, in his visit to Myanmar, called for the complete 
dismantling of sanctions against the country. It would not be surprising to 
see Russia making offers to build a nuclear power plant in Myanmar or 
engaging in weapons trade (Melkulangara 2013).
The Importance of Bangladesh
For India, Bangladesh’s significance for the access to its Seven Sister’s 
cannot be underestimated. Access through the country can be a key to 
the development of the Northeast of India as it could access the sea to 
connect to larger markets for its products.
Economically, both countries share a strong and significant trade 
relationship despite a considerable trade deficit in favour of India. India 
has also provided the country with lines of credit for large infrastructure 
projects. However, the arrival of China as a competing power in the 
region has also given Bangladesh some leeway and has had a balancing 
effect in terms of the country’s protracted dependency on India.
As for China, the same strategy it uses in Sri Lanka applies to Bangladesh. 
Strategically, access to ports in Bangladesh can facilitate Beijing’s 
oversight of its SLOCs and be a key geographical location for its envisaged 
Maritime Silk Route. For the past four decades, China’s contribution 
to Bangladesh’s development in the form of economic aid, military 
assistance and infrastructure development has been significant. More 
recently the emphasis is being put on infrastructural development, which 
is largely benefiting Bangladesh and China for strategic purposes such as 
greater connectivity to China’s Yunnan province.
Like China, Japan has also been trying to make its way into the BoB 
through Bangladesh. Economically and strategically, Japan has been 
increasing its influence in the littoral nations and showing greater interest 
in the region. Tokyo’s new strategy may have been adopted due to the 
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country’s economic issues and the security environment in East Asia (the 
China factor), making the nation turn toward South Asia (Bangladesh and 
Myanmar). This move could also allow Japan to find alternative markets 
for goods and investment and alternative locations for production. 
Among other projects, the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) plan 
is a strategic initiative proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo 
Abe, which aims to promote industrial agglomeration along the Dhaka-
Chittagong-Cox’s Bazaar belt, and enhance economic ties stretching 
from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean (Daily Star 2014). The initiative would 
comprise three pillars. The first pillar is industry and trade; this would mainly 
consist of constructing the long-awaited deep-sea port on Matarbari 
Island, which would offer Bangladesh an important trade gateway to the 
rest of Asia and beyond. The second pillar is energy, the Matarbari Island 
has the potential to be developed into a massive supply base of primary 
energy such as coal, LNG, and oil. The electricity harnessed from those 
sources could catalyse development in industry and trade. The final pillar 
is transportation, which would enable greater industry, trade and energy 
production between Japan and Bangladesh. The initiative, approved in 
August 2014, will also allow Bangladesh to provide a gateway to the BoB, 
boost regional economics, and play a central role in strengthening the 
nexus between Southeast Asia and South Asia (Bhatnagar 2013).
The US and Bangladesh established a bilateral security dialogue in April 
2012, through which the US is providing assistance to the Bangladesh 
Navy in counterterrorism and maritime interdictions. This US-Bangladesh 
bilateral defence relationship is currently one of the most robust in South 
Asia.
Moscow is set to be a strong competitor to Washington in its aspiration 
of getting a foothold on Bangladesh’s energy reserves. The focus of the 
recent visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to Moscow (which was the first 
visit by a Bangladeshi Prime Minister in 40 years) was on energy and arms 
purchase. Russia is investing heavily to finance its arms exports, as well as 
to build the first nuclear reactor in Bangladesh (Bhadrakumar 2013).
China is arguably exerting the most influence on the littoral nations. The 
strategy of “China finances and builds transportation routes leading to its 
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hinterland and connects them to the upstream projects in neighbouring 
regions” has become very familiar to Asian nations. China’s financial 
strategy includes FDI, aid, assistance and loans. Littoral nations invest in 
cooperation and partnerships as they are all trying to balance out their 
dependencies on one single power and diversify their partnerships. 
Amid the strategic competition between the major powers, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar and Sri Lanka appear to have adopted an equidistant 
approach in managing their relationships with these actors. At the same 
time, the littorals are attempting to leverage their geostrategic location 
in the BoB by using the competition to their advantage and giving equal 
priority to their engagements with the major powers (Sakhuja 2010). In 
this context, the perceived spectre of India-China or China-US rivalry 
does not loom large. What gives the smaller littorals a bargaining chip is 
their significance and role in the realization of the major powers’ larger 
strategic ambitions. To a certain extent, all the littorals can either facilitate 
connectivity and contribute to energy security or provide larger markets for 
trade to the major regional players. In return, these nations are benefiting 
from infrastructure development, financial assistance, integration, military 
modernization, etc. So far, the partnership between major powers and 
smaller littorals based on soft power has added stability to the security 
environment of the BoB. 
Militarization and the Changing Security Landscape 
All the talks of “rebalancing”, securing SLOCs, attaining energy security, 
competition over scarce resources and the claims to sovereignty are 
potential drivers of conflict. In that regard, it is possible that the region 
might see a rapid militarization to protect and defend these interests. 
Policymakers in Beijing, Delhi, and Washington are aware of the idea that 
“the Indian Ocean and its adjacent waters will be a central theatre of 
global conflict and competition this century” (Kaplan 2010). If we look 
at the military developments of the past two decades in the region, one 
cannot deny the spiralling naval spending in the IOR and the SCS. Figure 
7 shows Asian nations’ military expenditure in the past 20 years.
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In the past few decades, a geopolitical shift has been emerging in the 
BoB. The region has become a centre of attention for regional and extra-
regional powers, but none is considered to be the single most dominant 
maritime power. 
Although the United States’ maritime capabilities are still ahead of both 
China and India, the balance of power could change and foster ambitions 
for regional hegemony on the part of one of the two contenders (HCSS 
2010). The US is by far the highest spender on overall defence and on 
maritime capabilities, allocating about 28% of its overall defence budget 
on maritime expenditures, amounting to a colossal USD 156 billion. China, 
on the other hand, dedicates 15% of its overall defence budget to its 
naval forces, amounting to USD 10.5 billion, while India allocates 7% of 
its overall defence expenditures for maritime power, amounting to a 
relatively modest amount of USD 2 billion (HCSS 2010). However, over the 
next decade, the defence budgets of China and India are projected 
to grow considerably. The maritime balance of power depends on the 
number and the nature of naval assets deployed in the region. Within the 
next two decades, the presence of assets in the Indian Ocean is expected 
to increase substantially (HCSS 2010). 
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As India’s Navy has evolved, it has shown ambition to project influence 
and power across the IOR and beyond (Stimson Report 2012). India has 
growing security relationships with all of its BoB neighbours and is keen to 
demonstrate its credentials in areas such as maritime policing, counter 
terrorism, and humanitarian disaster relief. It has participated significantly 
in relief operations, assisted in the aftermaths of major cyclones and has 
been involved in numerous counter-piracy operations (Stimson Report 
2012). Delhi has been building its military power in the BoB, including new 
naval and air facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands that run north-
south through the Bay, allowing it to potentially dominate the western end 
of the Malacca Strait and much of the surrounding waters (Brewster 2014). 
The Indian Navy is also gradually being ‘rebalanced’ towards the Bay 
through the expansion of its Eastern fleet with new carriers and nuclear 
submarines. 
China is expanding its naval power projection capabilities well beyond its 
littoral, and indeed well beyond the SCS. Aside from alarming India and 
other Asian states, the rise in China’s maritime power is also of concern to 
the US. The expansion of China’s naval capabilities and broader military 
profile signifies its great-power status. The country’s new naval strategy 
of “far sea defence” is aimed at giving Beijing the ability to project its 
power in key oceanic areas, most significantly in the Indian Ocean (Pant 
2010). Moreover, China has been acquiring naval facilities along crucial 
choke-points in the IOR not only to serve its economic interests but also to 
enhance its strategic presence and protect energy imports (as it cannot 
rely on US naval power for unhindered access to energy) (Pant 2010). 
The efforts of India and China to expand their influence in each other’s 
backyards may result in regional conflicts, as is already apparent between 
the US and China in the South China Sea. The danger is that conflicts at 
sea could spill over to other areas of contention and also affect smaller 
littoral nations. For example, a war at sea between India and China could 
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Maintaining peace and stability in the Bay of Bengal
Challenges to Stability 
As shown above, the Bay region is vital to Asia’s rising powers, but its 
low-lying littorals, home to over half a billion people, are vulnerable to a 
number of trans-boundary issues and threats.
At present, population growth, climate change, overexploitation of 
fisheries, degradation of critical habitats, pollution, and deteriorating 
water quality are reshaping the Bay. The pace and breadth of these 
challenges require regional cooperation that encourages the countries 
around the Bay to rise above their political fault-lines to work together. The 
Maldives, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia are currently working together under the Bay of Bengal Large 
Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Project designed to improve the lives of the 
coastal populations through improved regional management of the Bay 
of Bengal environment and its fisheries. The project has been allocated a 
budget of US$ 31 million for a period of 5 years (BOBLEM 2014).
The BoB’s coasts are threatened by water conflicts in the Himalayas, and 
by the fracking of oil and gas in the deep sea. Dam construction in China 
and India poses a threat to downstream communities in India, Bangladesh 
and mainland Southeast Asia. The rising sea level, the subsiding of deltaic 
lands, and the accelerated intrusion of saltwater onto farmlands pose 
a severe threat to food production that would adversely affect millions. 
Climate change has exacerbated these impending consequences. 
Scientists have predicted a rise in the frequency and intensity of the Bay’s 
deadly cyclones that in the past few years affected more than 18 million 
people in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand. Yet on an optimistic 
note, the Bangladesh Cabinet approved the “National Oceanographic 
Research Institute Act” to establish a research institute within a maritime 
university to address the growing ecological and environmental concerns 
in the Bay of Bengal. 
Another major challenge to stability comes from limited institutional 
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capacities of the littoral nations, the majority of which we can qualify as 
“weak states”. Internal political instability is one of the main obstacles to 
development, growth and cooperation. Most of the littoral nations of the 
Bay have been affected by it. Large amounts of investments went to Sri 
Lanka only after the civil war ended in 2009. Following the end of military rule, 
Myanmar is experiencing unprecedented FDI investment and is opening up 
to the western world because of the government’s reforms. These examples 
help us understand the importance of political stability and its correlation to 
economic development, regional partnerships and overall prosperity. 
Weak governance in particular near important choke points carries the risk 
of making these areas more vulnerable to piracy and terrorism. 
It is, hence, in the best interest of not just regional, but also extra-regional 
powers to confront threats arising from piracy and terrorism at sea. The BoB 
urgently needs more effective cooperation for environmental protection and 
the mitigation of terrorist and piracy attacks on crucial sea routes - largely by 
the littoral countries as the most vulnerable. There remains a pressing need for 
more coordinated and comprehensive policies. Hope for a new regionalism 
lies in recognizing that the Bay’s integrity, stability and ecology transcend 
national frontiers.
Competition not Conflict
There are certain potential sources of conflict in the BoB - geostrategic 
tension, growing energy demand leading to greater competition, and 
maritime relations, to name a few. The rise of China and India is affecting the 
international geopolitical landscape. As world history attests, the dramatic 
rise of a new power usually creates volatility in the international system 
(Chellany 2009).
The growing energy demand of the emerging powers will likely become 
a source of contention and competition. Additionally, since most of the 
major players in the Bay are investing in a military build-up, the nature of the 
confrontation might become more problematic. It is difficult to predict if and 
how these disputes will heat up but they are all potential sources of conflict 
and rivalry (HCSS 2010).
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Despite this somewhat bleak scenario, it seems that states have more 
incentive to cooperate than to confront each other. Over the last two 
decades, China and India have become increasingly economically 
interdependent. China’s involvement in the development of BoB littorals 
leads to even greater interdependencies. These economic interests 
reduce the risks of conflict, forcing the countries to think more about 
their mutual benefits. Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and the 
expanding memberships of regional organizations such as ASEAN, SAARC, 
the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), or the BIMSTEC have a positive 
effect, particularly with regard to Sino-Indian relations. These institutions 
facilitate regional integration, mediate conflicts and promote healthy 
competition. Cooperation through an institutional body could assist the 
member countries in strengthening their external competitiveness. This 
could take the form of trade facilitation, infrastructure building, and 
technical assistance for complying with international standards. 
Although it is often difficult to achieve in practice, the process of 
addressing common security challenges in the BoB (e.g., piracy and 
maritime terrorism) may also create a positive momentum on which to 
build a working relationship (HCSS 2010). 
The ways in which the key powers will address mutual (and sometimes 
conflicting) maritime interests will directly affect the global balance of 
power and play a large role in determining the geopolitical landscape of 
the decades to come. The most significant ones involve changes in the 
balance of power and the risk of violent conflict and insecurity along the 
SLOCs, resulting in large-scale economic disruption and the rerouting of 
energy supply (HCSS 2010).
As a component of broader diplomatic relations, maritime relations 
between the major players in the BoB contribute to either confrontational 
or cooperative behaviours. Cooperation that addresses shared 
challenges as nuclear proliferation or international terrorism facilitates the 
establishment of working relationships. It may also have a trust-building 
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The way forward and cooperation architecture
The regional security architecture calls for active multilateralism. However, 
countries such as China rather engage bilaterally with the South Asian 
countries than through regional platforms (BCIM, BIMSTEC, etc.). 
Bilateralism in such a dynamic region is a double-edged sword on the one 
hand, bilateral projects are usually more flexible and faster to execute; 
on the other hand, bilateralism allows major powers to blunt unanimous 
opposition to their policies and keep the region divided. 
It is becoming more evident that no single state will be able to dominate 
the region. Therefore, a multilateral setup will emerge to allow each 
country to pursue its goals on equal terms. For that to occur, it is necessary 
that countries give more credibility to multilateral arrangements. In view of 
the circumstances and geo-political realities, the US will have to change 
its position from dominance to partnership with the regional powers. It 
may, in the future, act as a ‘balancer’ between China and India. 
The geopolitical landscape of the BoB will evolve in different ways over 
the next decades. It will mainly depend upon the level and nature of 
the maritime build-up and the level of cooperative or confrontational 
relations between the powers. Because of the extraordinary growth 
rates recorded by the economies of China, India, and other countries in 
southern Asia, experts are predicting that the world’s economic centre of 
gravity will gradually shift to the East. This is largely a result of the particular 
economic policies of these countries, oriented toward export-led growth. 
At the same time, these countries are also heavily dependent on imports, 
especially the Chinese and Indian economies, in order to meet the 
expanding energy needs of their growing industries and populations. 
In the future, there may be more stability since many littoral states are 
moving towards a democratic system that will create more investor 
confidence. Superpowers may also rely on soft rather than hard power in 
their competition. As for the US, Kaplan predicts a waning in their presence 
as an “elegant decline from hegemony by fostering cooperation with 
other navies to protect the maritime commons. The more China and India 
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rise, the more welcome US power will be in the region as a counterbalance 
to both” (Kaplan 2010).
The BoB will require close attention in the coming years. As the Bay will 
become a playground in a nascent multi-polar world order, it is of the 
utmost importance to establish governance frameworks that will facilitate 
the integration of rising powers in regulating this order and upholding the 
principles of an open world economy (Kaplan 2010).
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